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Abstract
Radio-frequency identification(RFID) cards are widely applied in daily human life. The information
security of RFID cards, such as data confidentiality, tag anonymity, mutual authentication etc, has
been fully studied. In the paper, using the RFID cards in MIFARE Classic and DESFire families,
a bidirectional covert channel via multipurpose RFID cards between service providers is built to leak
sensitive data between two simulation systems. Furthermore, by calculations and experiments, the daily
channel capacity to leak data of the channel is obtained. Although the storage capacity of a single RFID
card is very small, a large user base can still bring about a considerable amount to leak data. Then, the
reasons for the existence of such channels are discussed. To eliminate this type of covert channels, a new
authentication protocol between RFID cards and card readers are proposed. Our experimental results
show a significant security improvement in prevention of such covert communications while keeping user
convenience.
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I Introduction
Radio-frequency identification(RFID) technology
was introduced in 1946.[19] In the past 30 years,
RFID have been developed rapidly, and play an
important role in the automatic identification tech-
nology due to its advantages such as low cost, small
size, quick identification and even battery-free. It
also has a great economy effect. “in 2017, the total
RFID market will be worth $11.2 billion, up from
$10.52 billion in 2016 and $9.95 billion in 2015.
This includes tags, readers and software/services
for RFID labels, cards, fobs and all other form fac-
tors, for both passive and active RFID. IDTechEx
forecast that to rise to $14.9 billion in 2022.”[4]
As a kind of product form, RFID cards are
widely used in daily human life to keep us con-
venience. The main applications involve entrance
guards, consumer stored-value cards and public
traffic cards etc.
However, the more RFID services are provided,
the more RFID cards are needed. It is inconve-
nient if a user has to take so many RFID cards.
Therefore, in a certain region such as a campus or
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a factory, an “all-in-one” technique is utilized to
realize multiple RFID services by using one single
card. The main advantage of the “all-in-one” tech-
nique is that the count of cards is reduced, hence
the cost is decreased. Meanwhile, users’ cost of
carry is reduced. However, there is a potential se-
curity risk that such a multi-purpose card can also
be exploited as the payload of a covert channel.
A covert channel is a well-known way to transmit
messages by circumventing security mechanisms.
The definition of a covert channel was given by
Lampson in 1973 to describe the leakage of data
due to abuse of shared resources by processes with
different privilege levels[25]. In the last 40 years,
the idea of a covert channel has been extended
from a single host to a network, even to several
networks that are physically separated from each
other. The most famous single-host covert channel
is exploited by Meltdown[28] and Spectre[23] that
cause a great security issue early in 2018. The net-
work covert channels through which sensitive data
are hidden in network packages with steganography
were surveyed by Zander[43] in 2007. A physically
separated covert channel, also called an air-gapped
covert channel, leaks data directly via a physical
emitting source such as an LED[29, 38, 15, 14, 44,
45], an acoustic source[18, 35, 26, 12, 13] or an
antenna[24, 10, 9, 11, 31] etc. No any normal chan-
nel can be utilized for such air-gapped covert chan-
nels. Therefore, an air-gapped covert channel must
be built by finding a new communication method.
Most researches on RFID security focus on
lightweight algorithm, anonymity, integrity, confi-
dentiality and efficiency. The situation under which
two or more service providers collude with each
other is ignored. If the service providers are in
different levels, they can communicate with each
others illegally by using the memory in the RFID
cards together. This type of malicious covert com-
munications hide themselves into a normal business
process. And the covert data transmitted illegally
are stored in encrypted storage spaces in the card.
Therefore, few method can detect them effectively.
In the paper, a prototype on this type of covert
channels between service providers is introduced.
The effectiveness to leak data is evaluated by cal-
culating the daily channel capacity. The reasons for
the existence of such covert channels are discussed.
A novel authentication protocol is proposed to pre-
vent of such covert communications.
The new authentication protocol can be uti-
lized to prevent the collusion of multiple service
providers effectively. The risk of such covert chan-
nels is eliminated. Thus the security of RFID cards
in the “all-in-one” mode is maintained.
The new authentication protocol can also be re-
ferred to design a new generation of multi-purpose
RFID cards used in the “all-in-one” mode. Mean-
while, the design idea of the new protocol can be
extended to other similar application models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Re-
lated works are described in Section II. The techni-
cal background is described in Section III. A proto-
type is introduced in Section IV. Section V presents
and discuss our experimental results. A new pro-
tocol against the attack is proposed in Section VI.
Finally, our conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II Related Works
In the past 20 years, the study on RFID security
focus on lightweight algorithms for the fast speed
of hash functions. In 2005, Yang et al.[42] pro-
posed a mutual authentication protocol in a hos-
tile surrounding. Not surprisingly, the protocol
was compromised by replay attack. Luo et al.[30]
introduced another mutual authentication proto-
col in the same year to extend the protocol pre-
sented by Ohkubo et al.[34] in using the two hash
functions for updating secret values. The proto-
col was defeated by DoS and replay attacks. In
2006, Lee et al.[27] proposed a mutual authenti-
cation scheme on synchronized secret information
using both XOR(exclusive or) and hash chains to
authenticate tags and readers. The scheme failed
in a tag impersonation. In 2007, Kang and Lee[22]
introduced another mutual authentication protocol
reducing the key length and communications. The
protocol is also failed by a tag impersonation. Han
et al.[17] proposed a mutual authentication proto-
col based on synchronized secret information. The
protocol is vulnerable in replay attacks. Ha et al.
presented LRMAP[16], a resynchronous mutual au-
thentication protocol that can recover synchroniza-
tion between the database and the tag. The proto-
col can be compromised by a DoS attack. In 2008,
Cai Qingling et al.[37] introduced a minimalist mu-
tual authentication protocol using CRC(Cyclic Re-
dundancy Check). The protocol failed in a tag and
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reader impersonation. Tan et al.[40] proposed an
authentication protocol without need for a central
database. The protocol was also compromised by
replay attack. Song et al.[39] introduced another
authentication protocol. In 2009, Cai et al.[2] stud-
ied several mutual authentication protocols and
proposed revised protocols to eliminate the vul-
nerabilities. The revised protocols were also vul-
nerable by DoS and tag impersonations. In 2011,
Piramuthu[36] surveyed 10 mutual authentication
protocols from 2005 to 2009. In 2015, Cho et al.[3]
proposed a hash-based tag mutual authentication
protocol. In 2018, Gope et al.[8]introduced an au-
thentication scheme for distributed IoT infrastruc-
ture.
In 2007, Heydt-Benjamin et al.[20] found the
vulnerabilities in the first-generation RFID-enabled
credit cards. Garcia[7]showed that MIFARE Clas-
sic, a widely used smart card, was vulnerable to
reverse engineering and man-in-the-middle attack
in 2009. Du¨zenli[6] proposed a novel approach that
applies neural network forecasting to security for
closed-loop prepaid cards based on low-cost tech-
nologies such as RFID and 1-Wire in 2015. In
2017, Hossain et al.[21] proposed a security solu-
tion of an RFID card through cryptography. Xu
et al.[41] proposed a side-channel attack on a pro-
tected RFID card in 2018.
III Technical Background
A RFID Card
RFID uses carrier waves of various bands, such
as 120∼150 kHz, 13.56 MHz, 433 MHz, 860∼960
MHz, 2.45 GHz and 5.8 GHz. Among them, the
band on 120∼150 kHz is used for animal identifica-
tion and factory data collection; The bands on or
higher than 433 MHz are used for the application
with long distance over 1 m. The band on 13.56
MHz is used for most RFID cards such as smart
cards, memory cards and micro processor cards,
which serve our daily life.[5]
Protocols on the 13.56 MHz band are ISO 14443
Type A, ISO 14443 Type B, ISO 15693, ISO 18000-
3 Mode 1&2, ISO 18092 NFC, EPC HF CLASS 1
and EPC HF Version 2 etc.
B Protocols and Products
ISO 14443 Type A is commonly used for entrance
guards, metro cards and consumer stored-value
cards. They occupy a high market ratio.
The part of corresponding products are follows:
• MIFARE Ultralight: also called U10, 64 B
memory;
• MIFARE Ultralight C: also called U20, 192 B
memory;
• MIFARE Classic S50: 1 kB memory;
• MIFARE Classic S70: 4 kB memory;
• MIFARE DESFire family.
Among them, there is no cryptography function in
MIFARE Ultralight family. They are only memory
cards.
The encryption algorithm in MIFARE Classic
family is a proprietary algorithm, Crypto-1, created
by NXP Semiconductors. The algorithm was at-
tacked by a reverse-engineering and was published
in 2008.[33] The initial encrypt key is “FF FF FF
FF FF FF” or other fix form. A MIFARE Clas-
sic card can easily be cracked quickly if there is a
known sector key in the card. The most popular
crack tool is MIFARE Classic Offline Cracker[32].
Although cards in MIFARE Classic family are not
safe, they have been always the mainstream in the
RFID market till now for their low costs.
Three well-known public block algorithms DES,
3DES and AES are applied in MIFARE DESFire
family to make the cards safer than the ones on pre-
vious generation. The initial master key for DES
is “00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00”. There is not any
effective attack on MIFARE DESFire family.
IV Attack Model
We suppose that the attack occurs in a place such
as campus or firm using the “all-in-one” RFID
cards. And there are two service providers: A and
B. They provide different services to a same group
of users. A user pays a bill or authenticates his/her
identity with a same RFID card. Because two ser-
vice are different, they occupy the different stor-
age spaces (also called sectors or applications) on
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an RFID card. For the safety of their data, ser-
vice providers always set access keys on their users’
cards. and the keys are strictly confidential. Mean-
while, for users, all these things are transparent.
Only when they view the balance or pass an access
control, they can know whether their RFID cards
are available.
Figure 1: Schematic Diagram of Attack Model
However, when two service providers are at dif-
ferent security levels, the design of this type of
multi-purpose cards for convenience has a great se-
curity risk.
A
App 1
App 2
App 3
App 4
...
App n
B
(a) Safe Access by Two Service Providers
A
App 1
App 2
App 3
App 4
...
App n
B
(b) Unsafe Access by Two Service Providers
Figure 2: Two Access Form by Two Service
Providers
Shown in Figures 1 and 2a, we suppose that the
service of A is in a high security level. Its card
readers and server are settled in an air-gapped net-
work. The server connects with other computers in
order to provide effective data information to the
users in time, such as attendance information on
an entrance guard system etc. In comparison, the
service of B is in a lower security level or a public
level. For ease of management and operation, the
readers and server connect with the less security
network or Internet. For example, the service can
be an RFID card toll system in a restaurant or a
canteen.
Shown in Figure 2b, if A colludes with B, they
can communicate each other covertly by accessing
RFID cards. Then the sensitive data in a high se-
curity network would be leaked to a lower security
network or Internet. Generally, the storage spaces
can be accessed with the default key if the access
keys to the storage spaces have not been changed.
Therefore, A and B can exchange information by
accessing these spaces with the default key. They
can also change the keys to these spaces to avoid
detection and keep their messages secret. Even if
all the keys to other spaces have been changed by
others, A and B can also communicate covertly by
using the spaces assigned to them.
Even if A and B do not collude with each other,
if their keys are obtained with other ways, the at-
tacker can also transmit data covertly in the normal
business procedure by reprogramming the execu-
tion codes of the readers.
Now a prototype of such attacks is proposed.
A Frame Structure
The capacity of the storage spaces accessed by A
and B to transmit message is very small. There-
fore, large-sized data should be divided into groups
before transmission.
For an efficient packet transmission, the packet
frame is designed. The structure of a packet frame
is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Frame Structure
Bit 1 in the frame represents the transmission
direction: ‘0’ represents from A to B; ‘1’ represents
from B to A. Bit 2 means that whether CRC is
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used in frame tail. Bits 3∼4 represent transmission
status listed in Table 1. Bits 5∼16 are formed a
frame counter. Bits 17∼32 are used to record the
payload length. There is a 32-bit CRC in the frame
tail if Bit 2 of the frame head is ‘1’.
Table 1: Transmission Status
Bits Transmission Status Payload
00 Normal Transmission Yes
01 Succeed to Transmit No
10 Ask for Transmit Again No
11 Query for Transmission Status No
Therefore, the frame is variable-length. Suppos-
ing that the capacity of the storage spaces accessed
by A and B is s bytes, beside the 2-byte frame
head and the 2-byte payload length, there are al-
most s− 4 bytes for the payload of a frame.
Once a frame is found on an RFID card by the
receiver, the whole frame would be read from the
card according to the length recorded in the frame
head. Then, the CRC will be verified if Bit 2 is
‘1’. If there is no error, the payload is stored in the
computer with the order of the frame counter. And
Bit 4 of the frame head in the card will be set as
‘1’; If there is something wrong, the payload will
be abandoned. And Bit 3 of the frame head in the
card will be set as ‘1’. Bit 2 is set as ‘0’, that is, no
CRC is needed.
To improve transmission efficiency, if there are
some data needed to be sent back, the receiver can
use the rest of storage space in length of s−2 bytes
to send the data in frames. In the same way, if the
data package sent by receiver is lost, such as the
card user asked for a leave for a while, the sender
have not received the transmission status of some
frame. Then the sender can query for the trans-
mission status actively. At the moment, Bits 2∼4
are set as ‘011’. And the frame counter is set as
the frame number for which will be queried. The
length of payload is set as zero. The sender can
also send more frame in the rest of storage space.
In short, frames can be cascaded as long as there
is enough space in the card.
B Channel Rate
We suppose that there are c users who use the ser-
vices of A and B frequently. And in average, one
user use the two services alternately for f times
per day. Then, in a whole day, the capacity of the
covert communication between A and B is:
2× c× f × s bytes
Getting rid of the frame heads and tails, the ac-
tual maximum capacity for the payloads is:
2× c× f × (s− 6) bytes
V Results and Discussion
To test the effectiveness of this attack, we used
mainstream RFID cards and card readers on the
market. And we developed two RFID cards ser-
vice simulation systems. The service systems are
used to simulate the attack scenario described in
the previous section.
A Experimental Setting
Hardware:
• RFID cards: MIFARE Classic S50 × 10;
• Card readers: PN532 × 2;
• 2 USB-TTL adapters.
Software:
• Operating System: Ubuntu 18.04;
• Driver: libnfc;
• Program Language: GNU C;
• Database: SQLite.
The two systems: entrance guard system and
canteen toll system, were developed with the soft-
ware configuration above. Shown in Figure 4 and
Figure 5, functions of the entrance guard sys-
tem involve creating accounts, judging user’s legit-
imacy and service records query; and functions of
the canteen toll system involve creating accounts,
recharge, payment and service records query.
Now, we use 10 RFID cards to create accounts on
both systems. That is, these 10 cards can be used
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Entrance Guard System
Creating Accounts Judging Legitimacy Service Records Query
Figure 4: Functions in Entrance Guard System
Canteen Toll System
Creating Accounts Recharge Payment Service Records Query
Figure 5: Functions in Canteen Toll System
on both systems at the same time. Then we sim-
ulated the attackers, tampered with the function
to judge user’s legitimacy in the access control sys-
tem and the payment function in the canteen toll
system. Malicious codes are injected in so that the
card reader could read and write to other storage
spaces while working normally.
There are 16 sectors in a MIFARE Classic S50
card. One sector is made up of 4 blocks. Except
the first block in the first sector and the last block
in every sector, the rest blocks can be used to read
and write data by using the keys to their sectors.
Because only the first block in the first sector is
needed to read by the entrance guard system to
find the tag ID. Hence no block space is needed
to store data in the system; On the other hand,
the first block and the third block in the third sec-
tor are used by the canteen toll system to store a
username and the balance respectively. Therefore,
there are 45 blocks that can be exploited for covert
communications.
We suppose that on weekdays these 10 users go
through the entrance guard system and start their
work in the morning, and have their lunch after
payment on the canteen toll system, then continue
their work in the afternoon passing the entrance
guard system, finally have their dinner in the can-
teen after their work. It’s a very common scene in
big cities. Thus, one user uses the both services
alternately for 2 times in a whole day.
B Results
According to the experimental settings, we know
that:
s = 45× 16 = 720 bytes
c = 10
f = 2
Therefore, the capacity of the covert communi-
cation between both systems in a whole day is
2 × 720 × 10 × 2 = 28800 bytes. This number is
small, but it is enough to transmit secret informa-
tion such as passwords, private keys and credit card
numbers etc.
The daily capacities of the covert communication
via different type of RFID cards are listed in Table
2 when 10 users use the both services alternately
for 2 times.
Table 2: Daily Capacities of Different Type of
RFID Cards
Card Type Total Cap. Transmission Cap.
S50 1,024 B 28,800 B
S70 4,096 B 120,960 B
D21 2,048 B 71,680 B
D41 4,096 B 145,920 B
D81 8,192 B 294,400 B
C Discussion
Reasons for the existence of this type of covert
channels are follows:
Firstly, the access key is the only evidence to ver-
ify the validity of a card reader to the card. The
idea comes from cryptography, but is not very suit-
able to access control of RFID.
Secondly, the design of RFID cards does not
match with the security requirement in the “all-
in-one” mode. In the “all-in-one” mode, it is usual
that several service providers access a same card.
And the owner of a reader is not fixed in the long
term. When some service providers quit, they can
sell part or all of their readers to other service
providers.
Finally, collusion between different service
providers is considered unlikely. In the view of
cryptography, once a service provider shares its ac-
cess keys to others, the security of its data is not
guaranteed. Therefore, no service provider would
share its access keys actively. However, there are a
lot of situations under which the access keys of a
service provider is shared. Some general situations
are follows:
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• The service provider is compromised by a
hacker;
• The service provider mistakenly believed the
assurance of another;
• The benefits of sharing the keys far outweigh
the possible losses.
Generally, the evidence to verify the validity of
a card reader to a card should be something that
can not be copied easily.
VI Proposed Protocol
To avoid the covert communication between service
providers via RFID cards, a trusted third party, an
RFID card administrator, is introduced. Therefore,
four parties take part in the new protocol. They
are:
• RFID Card (Tag);
• RFID Card Reader (Reader);
• Service Provider (SP);
• Card Administrator (CA).
The proposed protocol assures technically that
the four parties can achieve the following objec-
tives.
• An SP can only access the storage space on
an RFID card according to the settings of the
CA.
• When a reader is needed to added or changed
by an SP, the reader must be registered with
the CA to get an encrypted command.
• Different SPs can not use the same card reader
serial number.
• Different SPs can not access the same storage
space on RFID cards.
A Data Storage
A.1 Tag
The data storage form on a tag is listed in Table
3, where TID is the serial number of tag. CA Key
is the common key with CA. Only CA can write
it into the card. Neither card holders nor SPs can
access it. Master Key is the key to access the card.
Both the CA and SPs know the master keys to their
users’ cards.
Table 3: Data Storage Form on Tags
TID
CA Key
Master Key
App1 Version
App1 White List
App1 App Key
Data of App1
App2 Version
App2 White List
App2 App Key
Data of App2
· · ·
For an app in the card, App White List is a list
of serial numbers and frequentness values of card
readers. A card reader can access an application
in the card with a correct app key only if the se-
rial numbers of the reader is in the white list of the
application. Otherwise, the tag will require for an
encrypted command ECAK(RID, IDApp, version).
If the card reader can not present a valid encrypted
command, it can not access the application even
if the app key is correct. App Version is a value
to remark the current version of encrypted com-
mands in the white list. When a new valid en-
crypted command comes, there are three possible
statues by comparing the version value in the new
command(CV ) and the App Version value(AV ):
1. If CV = AV , the values of RID and IDApp
will be inserted in the white list;
2. If CV < AV , it means that the new-coming
encrypted command is out-of-date.
3. If CV > AV , it means that the CA has up-
dated the version. And all items in the white
list are out-of-date. Then the white list will be
cleared, and the values of RID and IDApp will
be inserted in the white list.
Due to the limited storage space in an RFID
card, an app white list should be designed as a
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fixed-length list. A item in the list includes the
28-bit RID and 4-bit frequentness. The initial fre-
quentness value is 8. When the reader with RID ac-
cess the app, the frequentness is added by 1. Mean-
while, the tag chooses randomly one other frequent-
ness values that is decreased by 1. If the frequent-
ness value is already 15, it will not be added and
none of other frequentness values is decreased.
When the white list is full, the RID in list with
the minimal frequentness value will be replaced
with a new coming RID. The frequentness value
of the new RID is also the the minimal value; And
when the white list is cleared, all frequentness val-
ues are reset as the initial value, that is 8.
A.2 Reader
The data storage form on a card reader is listed
in Table 4. RID is the serial number of reader.
The list of app keys and encrypted commands
ECAK(RID, IDApp, version) to the applications
are stored in a card reader, where version is an
integer that will be increased when the SP of the
readers is changed.
Table 4: Data Storage Form on Readers
RID
IDAPP1
App1 App Key
ECAK(RID, IDApp1, version)
IDAPP2
App2 App Key
ECAK(RID, IDApp2, version)
· · ·
A.3 SP
The data stored in SPs’ servers are in the form of
a database table. The database table is used to
record the information of all tags with two fields:
serial number(TID) and master key.
A.4 CA
The data in the CA’s server are threefold: CA Key
and two database tables. One database table is
used to record the information of all tags as same
Table 5: Data Storage Form on SP
TID Master Key
· · · · · ·
Table 6: Data Storage Form on CA
CA Key
TID Master Key
· · · · · ·
IDSP RID IDAPP version
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
as the database table in SPs’ servers in the form;
The other database table is used to record the set-
tings of app distribution to the readers with four
fields: serial number of SP(IDSP ), serial number
of reader(RID), serial number of app(IDAPP ) and
version.
B Initialization
The procedure of initialization is divided into two
aspects: issuing cards to users and authenticating
the card readers.
When a card is issued to a user, the CA would
write the common key(CA Key) into the RFID
card. Then the card can decrypt the encrypted
command to verify the reader.
Meanwhile, every reader of all SPs must be
registered with the CA. The CA obtains the se-
rial number of a reader(RID) and determines the
application number that will be accessed by the
reader(IDAPP ). Then an encrypted command is
created by encrypting the content of RID, IDAPP
and version with the CA Key. Finally, the CA
writes the encrypted command into the reader.
C Authentication Procedure
The authentication procedure is described in Fig-
ure 6. This protocol is different from the previous
authentication protocols. The RFID card not only
checks whether the reader has the master key and
app key of the RFID card, but also checks whether
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the reader has a privilege to access related applica-
tions.
Step 1: Reader creates a nonzero random num-
ber r1, and transmit it to Tag.
Step 2: Tag receives r1, and creates another
random number r2. Then Tag encrypts them as
EMK(r1, r2) with the master key(MK). And Tag
calculate the hash value of exclusive or(XOR) of
its serial number(TID) and r1. Then Tag sends
hash(TID ⊕ r1) and EMK(r1, r2) to Reader.
Step 3: Reader forwards the message
hash(TID ⊕ r1) and r1 to SP. SP looks up its
database table, query the TID by calculating the
value of hash(TID ⊕ r1) for all the TIDs in the
table. If the TID is found, SP sends the MK of the
TID back to Reader.
Step 4: Reader decrypts EMK(r1, r2) with the
MK, and checks the value of r1. If it is equal
to the initial value, it means that Tag is valid.
Then Reader creates a random number r3, and
encrypts r2 and r3 as EAppK(r2, r3) with the ap-
plication key(AppK), and encrypts the serial num-
ber of app(IDAPP ) that is going to be accessed,
EAppK(r2, r3) and its serial number(RID) with the
MK as EMK(IDAPP , EAppK(r2, r3), RID). Then
Reader sends it to Tag.
Step 5:
Step 5.1 Tag decrypts
EMK(IDAPP , EAppK(r2, r3), RID) with
MK, and decrypts EAppK(r2, r3) with the ap-
plication key according to IDAPP . Then Tag
verifies r2. If r2 is correct, Tag judges whether
RID is in the white list of App IDAPP . If not,
Tag encrypts r3, the words “Query Auth” and
IDAPP as EAppK(r3, “Query Auth”, IDAPP ).
Then Tag sends it to Reader;
Step 5.2 Reader decrypts it, and verifies r3. If
r3 is correct, Reader queries an encrypted
command in its memory according IDAPP .
If the encrypted command is found, Reader
encrypts r3 and the encrypted command
as EAppK(r3, ECAK(RID, IDAPP , version))
with the application key, and sends it to Tag;
Step 5.3 Tag decrypts it, and decrypts
ECAK(RID, IDAPP , version) with the
CA key(CAK). Then Tag judges whether the
encrypted command is valid. The command
is valid if and only if “the RID and IDAPP
is matched with the session context, and the
value of version is not less than the value of
the App Version”. If not, Tag disconnects
the link with Reader and halts at once.
Otherwise, if the value of version is greater
than the value of the App Version, the white
list will be cleared. Finally, the value of RID
is inserted in the white list. And the value of
the App Version is updated as the value of
version.
Step 6: Tag and Reader calculate the session
key SK by the values of r2 and r3. Then they
encrypt the messages with the session key to start
further normal business process.
D Formal Security Verification Us-
ing ProVerif
We use ProVerif[1], an automatic cryptographic
protocol verifier in the formal model, to verify the
proposed protocol. Firstly, a public channel and
a basic type of variables are defined. Then, the
cryptography functions of the proposed protocol is
modeled, and the secret keys, events and authen-
tication queries are defined. Thirdly, the processes
of the tag and the reader are modeled respectively.
Finally, the whole process of the proposed protocol
is modeled.
The ProVerif code of the proposed protocol is
listed in the Appendix, and the simulation result
with ProVerif v2.00 is as follows.
RESULT in j−event (Tagend (x ) ) ==> i n j−event (
Tagbegin (x ) ) i s t rue .
RESULT in j−event ( Readerend ( x 30 ) ) ==> i n j−
event ( Readerbegin ( x 30 ) ) i s t rue .
RESULT not a t tacke r (Tname [ ] ) i s t rue .
RESULT not a t tacke r (Rname [ ] ) i s t rue .
The result demonstrates that the proposed pro-
tocol satisfies the security requirement of session
key and achieves mutual authentication success-
fully.
E Evaluations
The proposed protocol solves the problem that dif-
ferent SPs communicate with each other covertly
via RFID cards. However, some security matters
still should be taken care.
For example, an SP tampered with the sequence
number of card reader, and obtained corresponding
9
Figure 6: New Authentication Protocol
encrypted command. Hence any tag regards the
reader as another valid one. Then, the SP puts
two readers into one reader shell. Once the normal
work is done, the first reader shuts down, and the
second one starts to work immediately. Therefore,
the whole security mechanism is compromised.
In response, the continuous access from different
readers in a few seconds should be forbidden by
changing the circuit of RFID. If a card reader al-
ways requires the users to swipe their RFID cards
twice, the phenomenon will make people’s aware-
ness. Thus, the covertness of the communication
can not be guaranteed.
VII Conclusions
In the paper, a bidirectional covert channel via mul-
tipurpose RFID cards between service providers
was established. An attack prototype of informa-
tion leakage was implemented between two simula-
tion systems by using the RFID cards in MIFARE
Classic and DESFire families. The daily channel
capacity to leak data was obtained by calculations
and experiments. Furthermore, the reasons for ex-
istence of such covert channels were discussed. To
eliminate this type of covert channels, a new au-
thentication protocol between RFID cards and card
readers were proposed. Our results show that the
new authentication protocol can effectively avoid
covert communication between service providers
via RFID cards while keeping user convenience.
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Appendix
A ProVerif Code
(∗ Pr ivate channel ∗)
f r e e ch1 : channel [ p r i va t e ] .
f r e e ch2 : channel [ p r i va t e ] .
(∗ Publ ic channel ∗)
f r e e c : channel .
(∗ Symmetric key encrypt ion ∗)
type key .
fun senc ( b i t s t r i n g , key ) : b i t s t r i n g .
reduc f o r a l l m: b i t s t r i n g , k : key ; sdec (
senc (m, k ) , k ) = m.
type r o l e .
f r e e tag , r eader : r o l e .
(∗ Symmetric key gene ra t i on func t i on ∗)
fun genkey ( b i t s t r i n g , b i t s t r i n g ) : key .
(∗ Hash func t i on ∗)
fun hash ( b i t s t r i n g ) : b i t s t r i n g .
(∗ Xor func t i on ∗)
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fun xor ( b i t s t r i n g , b i t s t r i n g ) : b i t s t r i n g .
(∗ Authent icat ion que r i e s ∗)
event Tagbegin ( r o l e ) .
event Tagend ( r o l e ) .
event Readerbegin ( r o l e ) .
event Readerend ( r o l e ) .
query x : r o l e ; i n j−event (Tagend (x ) ) ==> i n j
−event ( Tagbegin (x ) ) .
query x : r o l e ; i n j−event ( Readerend (x ) ) ==>
i n j−event ( Readerbegin (x ) ) .
f r e e Tname , Rname : b i t s t r i n g [ p r i va t e ] .
query a t tacke r (Tname) ;
a t t a cke r (Rname) .
(∗ CA ∗)
l e t processCA ( ) =
new CAK: key ;
new MK: key ;
new AppK: key ;
in ( ch1 , TID : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
out ( ch1 , (CAK, MK, AppK) ) ;
in ( ch2 , RID : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
new ID APP : b i t s t r i n g ;
new ve r s i on : b i t s t r i n g ;
out ( ch2 , senc ( (RID , ID APP , ve r s i on
) , CAK) ) ;
out ( ch2 , (ID APP , MK, AppK) ) .
(∗ Tag ∗)
l e t processT ( ) =
new TID : b i t s t r i n g ;
out ( ch1 , TID) ;
in ( ch1 , (CAK: key , MK: key , AppK:
key ) ) ;
event Tagbegin ( tag ) ;
in ( c , r1 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
new r2 : b i t s t r i n g ;
out ( c , ( hash ( xor (TID , r1 ) ) , senc ( (
r1 , r2 ) , MK) ) ) ;
in ( c , EMK: b i t s t r i n g ) ;
l e t (ID APP : b i t s t r i n g , EAppK:
b i t s t r i n g , RID : b i t s t r i n g ) =
sdec (EMK, MK) in
l e t (=r2 , r3 : b i t s t r i n g ) = sdec (
EAppK, AppK) in
out ( c , senc ( ( r3 , ID APP) , AppK) ) ;
in ( c , EAppK2 : b i t s t r i n g ) ;
l e t (=r3 , ECAK: b i t s t r i n g ) = sdec (
EAppK2, AppK) in
l e t (=RID , =ID APP , ve r s i on :
b i t s t r i n g ) = sdec (ECAK, CAK) in
event Readerend ( reader ) ;
out ( c , senc (Tname , genkey ( r2 , r3 ) ) )
.
(∗ Reader ∗)
l e t processR ( ) =
new RID : b i t s t r i n g ;
out ( ch2 , RID) ;
in ( ch2 , ECAK: b i t s t r i n g ) ;
in ( ch2 , (ID APP : b i t s t r i n g , MK: key
, AppK: key ) ) ;
event Readerbegin ( reader ) ;
new r1 : b i t s t r i n g ;
out ( c , r1 ) ;
in ( c , (HTID: b i t s t r i n g , EMK:
b i t s t r i n g ) ) ;
l e t (=r1 , r2 : b i t s t r i n g ) = sdec (EMK
, MK) in
new r3 : b i t s t r i n g ;
out ( c , senc ( ( ID APP , senc ( ( r2 , r3 ) ,
AppK) , RID) , MK) ) ;
in ( c , EAppK: b i t s t r i n g ) ;
l e t (=r3 , =ID APP) = sdec (EMK, MK)
in
event Tagend ( tag ) ;
out ( c , senc ( ( r3 , ECAK) , AppK) ) ;
out ( c , senc (Rname , genkey ( r2 , r3 ) ) )
.
p roc e s s
( ( ! processCA ( ) ) | ( ! processT ( ) ) |
( ! processR ( ) ) )
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